F.A. Staudenmaier (1800-1856), eine der Zentralfiguren der Kath. Tübinger Schule und einer Theologie der lebendigen Auseinandersetzung mit dem dt. Idealismus und der Romantik, hat gerade in der Gotteslehre kirchliche Tradition und Gedankengut seiner Zeit zu vereinen gesucht. Seine Lehre von Gott ist getragen vom Lebensgedanken, der - verknüpft mit dem Gedanken vom absoluten Geist - die dreipersonale Lebenseinheit Gottes gegenüber pantheistischen Tendenzen sichert. Orientierung an und Distanzierung von Hegel kennzeichnen St.s. reifende und reife Theologie, deren Weitschweifigkeit durch diese Arbeit prägnant (...) zusammengefasst wird. (shrink)

Der Ruf nach Verantwortung bestimmt zunehmend wissenschaftliche Debatten, bewegt aber auch das Denken der Bürger. Franz-Xaver Kaufmann sieht in der Verantwortung "eine ethische Grundkategorie unseres gegenwärtigen Selbstverständnisses". -/- Freiheit und Verantwortung stehen in einem direkten Verhältnis. So sind die Menschen verantwortlich für die Entscheidungen, die sie treffen, und für deren Folgen. Allerdings sind die Handlungsketten in der modernen Gesellschaft komplexer geworden. Wer trägt welche Verantwortung für welche Handlungsbereiche? Versuche, die Verantwortung auf gesellschaftliche Organisationen abzuwälzen, sind keine Lösung. Jeder Einzelne, (...) aber auch jede Gruppe, muss sich jeweils der eigenen Verantwortung stellen. -/- Die Beiträge des Bandes gehen auf das 10. Deutsch-Amerikanische Kolloquium zurück, das 2008 in Philadelphia stattfand. (shrink)

J. G. Fichte’s »Tagebuch über den [animalischen] Magnetismus« [»Diary of the [animal] Magnetism«] from 1813 consists largely of excerpts and comments on reports from patients who have been treated with applications of animal magnetism. As part of the preparations for the critical edition of Fichte’s „Tagebuch über den Magnetismus“ the central text on which Fichte founded his further philosophical considerations could be identified: It is Franz Anton Mesmer’s „Allgemeine Erläuterungen über den Magnetismus und den Somnambulismus. Als vorläufige Einleitung (...) in das Natursystem.“ [„General Explanations about magnetism and somnambulism. As a preliminary introduction to the system of nature.”] of 1812. The following article shows how Fichte came into touch with the subject of animal magnetism and how he specifically dealt with Mesmer’s text. Mesmer’s concern to develop a unified conception of nature that brings all the laws of nature into a closed system matches with Fichte’s intention to form a systematic unity of all knowledge. However, Fichte discovered in Mesmer’s project several problematic concepts such as the constitution of the organism and of man as a spiritual being, which Fichte criticizes and makes the starting point for his own ideas. His idea of a liberal-idealistic and thus dynamic system of nature always remains present.J. G. Fichtes „Tagebuch über den [animalischen] Magnetismus“ aus dem Jahr 1813 besteht zum großen Teil aus Exzerpten und Kommentaren zu Berichten von Kranken, die mit Anwendungen des animalischen Magnetismus behandelt worden sind. Im Rahmen der Vorbereitungen für die kritische Herausgabe von Fichtes „Tagebuch über den [animalischen] Magnetismus“ konnte der zentrale Text, dessen kritische Lektüre Fichte zu seinen weitergehenden philosophischen Überlegungen führt, identifiziert werden: Es handelt sich um Franz Anton Mesmers „Allgemeine Erläuterungen über den Magnetismus und den Somnambulismus. Als vorläufige Einleitung in das Natursystem.“ von 1812. Im folgenden Aufsatz wird gezeigt, wie Fichte mit der Thematik des animalischen Magnetismus in Berührung kam und wie er sich speziell mit Mesmers Text auseinandersetzte. Mesmers Anliegen, eine einheitliche Naturkonzeption zu entwickeln, die alle Naturgesetzlichkeiten in ein geschlossenes System bringt, kommt Fichtes Intention nach systematischer Einheit allen Wissens entgegen. Allerdings entdeckt Fichte bei Mesmer etliche problematische Konzepte, etwa zur Konstitution des Organismus und des Menschen als geistigem Wesen, die er kritisiert und zum Ausgangspunkt eigener Überlegungen macht. Die Idee eines freiheitlich-idealistischen und damit dynamischen Natursystems bleibt dabei stets präsent. (shrink)

Terstenjak, A. Franz Webers philosophisches Gedankengut im Umriss.--Wolf, K. Franz Veber und Graz.--Ilc, M. Näheres zur Verdinglichung und Veranschaulichung in Webers Wirtlichkeitsfrage.--Pirjevec, D. Franz Webers ästhetisches Denken.--Urbančič, I. Philosophische Grundanschauungen bei Franz Weber.--Trofenik, R. Franz Weber.--Weber, F. Meine Beziehungen zu Meinong.--Weber, F. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Persönlichkeit.--Weber, F. Die Frage der Wirklichkeit.

In the spirit of Fontenelle's "Dialogues des morts", Dorschel stages an imaginary conversation between 18th century composer Joseph Haydn and 20th century composer Anton von Webern. In the section of Hades reserved for composers, they confront their different musical poetics.

This essay is an introduction to a lecture course "Elements of Descriptive Psychology" delivered by Anton Marty in around 1903/04. Marty offered courses on descriptive psychology at regular intervals in the course of his career at the University of Prague. The content of these courses follows closely the ideas of Marty’s teacher Franz Brentano, though with some interesting divergences and extrapolations. The present work is a historical and systematic introduction to an extract from notes taken of Marty’s lecture, (...) with some discussion of the work of Dilthey on similar topics, and of Marty’s influence on Franz Kafka and on the Gestalt psychologist Max Wertheimer. (shrink)

On the basis of Anton Marty’s 1867 Preisschrift, this article offers a reconstruction of the semiotic and linguistic investigations the Swiss philosopher develops just before becoming a student of Brentano. The paper then compares this account with the view on signs that will be given in Marty’s later work, as well as within the Austro-German tradition.

As a Swiss-born Austro-German philosopher who taught in Czernowitz and in Prague, Marty was not only a cosmopolitan thinker; he had also an exceptional knowledge of the history of philosophy and well-informed inclinations towards specific branches of the discipline. He was influenced by Aristotle, the Scholastics, and early modern philosophers (both rationalists and empiricists), and was unsympathetic towards Kant and German Idealism. Yet his main intellectual inspiration came from his master Franz Brentano, whose conception of philosophy as a science—especially (...) his fourth habilitation thesis—made a lasting impression on many of his students, most prominently on Marty and Stumpf. By way of presenting the contributions to this volume, we offer here a general outline of Marty’s life and works, of his Brentanian upbringing, and we sketch some of his central ideas in philosophy—more precisely on mind, language, and their ontology, with regards to the themes discussed in the contributions. (shrink)

The point of departure for Anton Marty's theory of intentionality is Franz Brentano's ontology of intentionality as outlined in the unpublished manuscript of his logic-lectures from the second half of the 1880's. This rich ontology comprises immanent objects, immanent propositional contents and states of affairs. The late Marty rejects all immanent entities in Brentano's sense and explains intentionality in terms of counterfactualconditionals.However,contraryto the late Brentano,he insists on the indispensability of the category of states of affairs. Consequently Marty can (...) formulate a realistic theory of truth, while Brentano holds an epistemic theory of truth. (shrink)

This volume brings together contributions that explore the philosophy of Franz Brentano. It looks at his work both critically and in the context of contemporary philosophy. For instance, Brentano influenced the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, the theory of objects of Alexius Meinong, the early development of the Gestalt theory, the philosophy of language of Anton Marty, the works of Carl Stumpf in the psychology of tone, and many others. Readers will also learn the contributions of Brentano's work to (...) much debated contemporary issues in philosophy of mind, ontology, and the theory of emotions. The first section deals with Brentano’s conception of the history of philosophy. The next approaches his conception of empirical psychology from an empirical standpoint and in relation with competing views on psychology from the period. The third section discusses Brentano’s later programme of a descriptive psychology or “descriptive phenomenology” and some of his most innovative developments, for instance in the theory of emotions. The final section examines metaphysical issues and applications of his mereology. His reism takes here an important place. The intended readership of this book comprises phenomenologists, analytic philosophers, philosophers of mind and value, as well as metaphysicians. It will appeal to both graduate and undergraduate students, professors, and researchers in philosophy and psychology. (shrink)

This volume brings together contributions that explore the philosophy of Franz Brentano. It looks at his work both critically and in the context of contemporary philosophy. For instance, Brentano influenced the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, the theory of objects of Alexius Meinong, the early development of the Gestalt theory, the philosophy of language of Anton Marty, the works of Carl Stumpf in the psychology of tone, and many others. Readers will also learn the contributions of Brentano's work to (...) much debated contemporary issues in philosophy of mind, ontology, and the theory of emotions. The first section deals with Brentano’s conception of the history of philosophy. The next approaches his conception of empirical psychology from an empirical standpoint and in relation with competing views on psychology from the period. The third section discusses Brentano’s later programme of a descriptive psychology or “descriptive phenomenology” and some of his most innovative developments, for instance in the theory of emotions. The final section examines metaphysical issues and applications of his mereology. His reism takes here an important place. The intended readership of this book comprises phenomenologists, analytic philosophers, philosophers of mind and value, as well as metaphysicians. It will appeal to both graduate and undergraduate students, professors, and researchers in philosophy and psychology. (shrink)

Anton Marty (Schwyz, 1847–Prague, 1914) contributed significantly to some of the central themes of Austrian philosophy. This collection contributes to assessing the specificity of his theses in relation with other Austrian philosophers. Although strongly inspired by his master, Franz Brentano, Marty developed his own theory of intentionality, understood as a sui generis relation of similarity. Moreover, he established a comprehensive philosophy of language, or "semasiology", based on descriptive psychology, and in which the utterer’s meaning plays a central role, (...) anticipating Grice’s pragmatic semantics. The present volume, including sixteen articles by scholars in the field of the history of Austrian philosophy and in contemporary philosophy, aims at exposing some of Marty’s most important contributions in philosophy of mind and language, but also in other fields of research such as ontology and metaphysics. As archive material, the volume contains the edition of a correspondence between Marty and Hans Cornelius on similarity. This book will interest scholars in the fields of the history of philosophy in the 19th and 20th centuries, historians of phenomenology, and, more broadly, contemporary theoretical philosophers. (shrink)

Franz Anton Mesmer (1734–1815), a physician who graduated from the University of Vienna, invented a therapy based on the concept of a universal fluid, similar to electricity, that flowed through all living things. By restoring the circulation of this fluid in the nerves of human bodies, he believed he could cure illness without resorting to medication. Few medical theories have enjoyed as great success as Mesmer's, first among French high society and then in Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Italy, (...) Sweden, Russia, Britain, and the US. Mesmerism was the circulatory phenomenon par excellence. Its success was founded not only on the hypothesis of the circulation of a fluid common to human physiology and the entire universe, but also on the scientific practices of the time—correspondence, translations, and periodicals—and some ardent and highly active supporters who ensured its spread. However, far from functioning along the lines of direct exportation–importation from one country to another, or a centre to the periphery, mesmerism's dissemination was the work of diffuse institutions and individual mobilities influenced by the modalities of communication. In seeking to reconstitute the wellsprings of these circulations, the first sources that come to mind are printed matter: the many pamphlets and especially the articles and reviews that appeared in periodicals, as well as the Romantic literature that flourished after 1810. Such documents are foundational for authoritative studies of mesmerism in Germany, which proceed from the thesis of successive “waves” of reception. Such sources, however, are somewhat misleading. Rather than taking them as our starting point, it would be better to reconstitute the channels of information by using many sources, both printed and handwritten. The complexity of the circulation of knowledge generated by mesmerism is implicitly testament to the difficulties arising from the institutionalization of this current. (shrink)

Anton Marty (1847-1914) is known to be the most faithful pupil of Franz Brentano. As a matter of fact, most of his philosophical ideas find their source in the works of his master. Yet, the faithfulness of Marty is not constant. As the rich correspondence between the two thinkers shows, Marty elaborates an original theory of intentionality from ca. 1904 onward. This theory is based on the idea that intentionality is a process of mental assimilation (ideelle Verähnlichung), a (...) process at the core of which lies a sui generis relation of “ideal similitude” holding between a thinking subject and its object. This study spells out the Martyian notion of mental assimilation and traces back Marty’s evolution from his earlier position (prominently described in the recently published Deskriptive Psychologie of 1893-1894) to his final view as it is found in the Untersuchungen of 1908. It turns out that besides Brentano, Husserl is a key figure in that evolution. Such a “genetic”elucidation of Marty’s last theory is required in order to reach the main goal of this paper, namely: the clarification of Marty’s degree of dependence upon Brentano with respect to the theory of intentionality. That being said, we do not merely intend to compare the mature Marty with Brentano: our “genetic” considerations will also allow us to describe the interaction between the two thinkers before 1904. Accordingly, we begin by presenting Brentano’s own position on intentionality in discussing its two currently competing readings, namely the “discontinuist” and the “continuist” one. Against a recent interpretation, we argue that Marty’s endorsement of a “discontinuist” reading is not based on a misunderstanding of Brentano’s position. (shrink)

One of the most important students of Franz Brentano was Anton Marty, who made it his task to develop a philosophy of language on the basis of Brentano’s analysis of mind. It is most unfortunate that Marty does not receive the attention he deserves, primarily due to his detailed and distracting polemics. In the analysis presented here his philosophy of language and other aspects of his thought, such as his ontology , are examined first and foremost in their (...) positive rather than critical character. The analysis is moreover supplemented by translations of four important works by Marty, including his entire work On the Origin of Language. These are in fact the first English translations of any substantial writings by him. The resulting picture that emerges from the analysis and translations is that Marty has much to say that proves to be of enduring interest for the philosophy of language on a range of topics, especially the meanings of statements, of emotive expressions, and of names as regards both their communicative and their ontological aspects. The volume will be of interest not only to philosophers and historians of philosophy, but also to historians of linguistics and psychology. (shrink)

El artículo analiza ciertos temas centrales de la filosofía del lenguaje de Anton Marty: primero, su teoría genética del origen casual del lenguaje; segundo, su descripción de los componentes mereológicos y semánticos del lenguaje, en particular del concepto de forma inter-na; tercero, su crítica del juicio categórico, basada en sus análisis de las oraciones impersonales y existenciales; cuarto, la importancia del concepto de existencia para aclarar problemas ontológicos. El trabajo hace además hincapié en señalar las conexiones entre su pensamiento (...) y el de Edmund Husserl, ambos discípulos de Franz Brentano.The article addresses some essential issues of Anton Marty’s philosophy of language: first, its genetic theory of the random origin of language; second, his description of the mereological and the semantic components of language, focused on the concept of internal form; third, its criticism of the categorical judgment, based on its analyses of impersonal and existential sentences; fourth, the importance of the concept of existence in order shed light upon ontological problems. The paper also focuses on emphasizing the connections between his thought and that of Edmund Husserl, both disciples of Franz Brentano. (shrink)

Franz Anton Mesmer’s 1766 thesis on the influence of the planets on the human body, in which he first publicly presented his account of the harmonic forces at work in the microcosm, was substantially copied from the London physician Richard Mead’s early eighteenth-century tract on solar and lunar effects on the body. The relation between the two texts poses intriguing problems for the historiography of medical astrology: Mesmer’s use of Mead has been taken as a sign of the (...) Vienna physician’s enlightened modernity while Mead’s use of astro meteorology has been seen as evidence of the survival of antiquated astral medicine in the eighteenth century. Two aspects of this problem are discussed. First, French critics of mesmerism in the 1780s found precedents for animal magnetism in the work of Paracelsus, Fludd and other early modern writers; in so doing, they began to develop a sophisticated history for astrology and astrometeorology. Second, the close relations between astrometeorology and Mead’s project illustrate how the environmental medical programmes emerged. The making of a history for astrology accompanied the construction of various models of the relation between occult knowledge and its contexts in the enlightenment. (shrink)

This article gives an overview of Mesmer's theory.

In the spring of 1784 the Marquis of Puységur, a great landowner and colonel in an artillery regiment, was called to the bedside of Victor, the son of his steward, who was suffering from pneumonia. Puységur was a follower of the new holistic medicine taught in an atmosphere of intense enthusiasm and scandal by Franz-Anton Mesmer, an Austrian doctor who had been living in Paris for several years. As a disciple of Mesmer, he intended to direct his ‘vital (...) fluid’ onto the young patient, by means of ‘magnetic passes’, to provoke ‘spasms’ which would lead to a calm state and an improvement in health. But things did not go as anticipated. Instead of displaying the anticipated spasms, the young Victor sank into a strange state of unconsciousness which, at first sight, resembled a deep sleep. Then he revived once more and came to life with a new personality. Freed from his inhibitions, he no longer spoke his habitual dialect, but the French of aristocrats, and he had no hesitation in berating his school teacher, whose secret thoughts he appeared to be able to read. Finally, he forecast the stages by which he would be cured and the remedies which would be suitable for him. Puységur wrote down all these strange facts and the following year he published a report which caused a sensation. Soon, throughout France, somnambulists appeared and observations about their subjects gathered. From that time onwards, the incomprehensible facts apparently evident in ‘provoked’ or ‘artificial somnambulism’ and also in ‘magnetic sleep’ - such expressions were used by Puységur and his followers for the state that he had just discovered - were to give rise to huge controversy. The Marquis of Puységur triggered the development nineteenth century of a movement of reflections and practices which have generally been referred to by the expression ‘animal magnetism’, invented by Mesmer. On the eve of the Revolution and throughout the nineteenth century this movement held a real fascination for philosophers, writers, and scholars. But there has been a tendency to overlook this episode in European culture, which has ultimately become a “lost continent” in our own period. (shrink)

On July 14, 1866 Franz Brentano stepped up to the pulpit to defend his thesis that “the true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences”. This thesis bound his first students to him and became the north star of his school, against the complex background of the progress and specialization of the natural sciences as well as the growth and professionalization of universities. I will discuss the project of the renewal of philosophy as science (...) in the School of Brentano and how this aimed to provide a scientific foundation for the humanities independently from the natural sciences, while preserving the unity of science. Through his well-known re-introduction of the concept of intentionality as criterion to distinguish internal and external perception, Brentano was able to supply an empirical foundation for the Geisteswissenschaften. While philosophy would use the method of natural science, its domain would not be nature, but consciousness: a full-blooded science of the mind that did not require a reduction to the physical in order to be scientific. Brentano’s science of consciousness was empirical, but not experimental, and relied on subjective methods, but was not introspective. Brentano’s students Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong, Christian von Ehrenfels, Edmund Husserl and others came to occupy important chairs in philosophy throughout Europe. While they were certainly not all orthodox followers, they adapted and spread his theories far and wide in the schools and movements they founded and influenced: Gestalt psychology, Prague linguistics, phenomenology, etc.. Moreover, the 19th century idea of scientific research as a collaborative and collective achievement led to a division of labor in Brentano’s school. Each of his students was meant to work out a part of the greater whole: Stumpf, the philosophy of sound and music; Marty, language; Meinong the history of philosophy; Husserl, mathematics; etc. Yet all of them also contributed to the shared project of the renewal of philosophy as science and discussed the (foundational) relation of philosophy to other sciences in programmatic works. Though often forgotten and overlooked due to contingent historical circumstances, the scientific paradigm of the School of Brentano was very fruitful and highly influential in philosophy and the human sciences in general, throughout the second half of the 19th and into the 20th centuries. Yet it is relevant then as now to preserve the independent scientific dignity of the humanities. (shrink)

This book does not contain philosophical arguments, but is rich in material for philosophical reflection. In this small volume Professor Fuller traces the evolution of an idea deriving from the Viennese physician, Franz Anton Mesmer, through nineteenth-century American popular culture. What began with Mesmer as a thoroughly materialistic and antitheological theory of medical healing ended the century in America as a dualistic theory with the New Thought movement emphasizing the spiritual powers of the mind to control matter. How (...) this came about gives us yet another illustration of the capacity of a culture to absorb a new idea, transform it, and use it in the interest of a dominant ideology. (shrink)

Die offizielle Urteilstheorie Brentanos war eine nicht-propositionale Theorie. Die These, dass man, um die in einem Urteilsakt involvierten intentionalen Beziehungen zu erklären, keine propositionalen Entitäten einführen muss, war in der Tat eine seiner interessantesten Ideen. Brentano hat aber im Laufe seiner Lehrtätigkeit sehr viele neue Wege ausprobiert und so finden wir in seinen Vorlesungen aus den späten achtziger Jahren auch eine Urteilstheorie, die jedem Urteilsakt eine propositionale Entität zuordnet. Gerade diese Lehre war für Brentanos Studenten besonders inspirierend. Vor allem (...) class='Hi'>Anton Marty und Carl Stumpf haben sehr interessante Theorien von solchen, wie sie es nannten, Inhalten entwickelt. 1888 hat Stumpf in seinen Vorle¬sun¬gen für der¬ar¬tige Entitäten den Ausdruck „Sachverhalt” ein¬geführt. Da sich vor allem diese Bezeichnung als terminus technicus durchgesetzt hat, werden wir sie in diesem Aufsatz auch in Bezug auf diejenigen Philosophen verwenden, die ihre propo¬sitionalen Entitäte anders nannten. Unter den treuen Brentanisten war es Anton Marty, der am konsequentesten an der Unentbehrlichkeit solcher Sachverhalte als Wahrmacher für richtige Urteile bestand. Seine Theorie hat jedoch einen etwas merkwürdigen Charakter. Die Sachverhalte werden einerseits als unverzichtbare Elemente des ontologischen Mobiliars angesehen, andererseits finden wir aber bei Marty eine deutliche Tendenz, sie als Strukturen zu interpretieren, die auf den Dingen (der nominalen Form), wie man es heutzutage gerne sagt, supervenieren. Der Sinn, in dem sie dann noch als unreduzierbar zu bezeichnen sind, ist nicht einfach zu eruieren. Der Philosoph, der sich von diesem, an sich sehr attraktiven, Supervenienz¬gedanken endgültig verabschiedet hat, war Alexius Meinong. Wir besprechen die Hauptpunkte seiner Kritik, untersuchen mögliche Auswege und versuchen die innere Spannung Martys Sachverhaltsbegriffs zwischen der Supervenienz und Unreduzierbarkeit ein wenig zu klären. (shrink)

There is a narrow thread in the vast literature on Kafka which pertains to Kafka’s knowledge of philosophy, and more precisely to Kafka’s use in his fictional writings of some of the main ideas of Franz Brentano. Kafka attended courses in philosophy at the Charles University given by Brentano’s students Anton Marty and Christian von Ehrenfels, and was for several years a member of a discussion-group organized by orthodox adherents of the Brentanian philosophy in Prague. The present essay (...) summarizes what is known about Kafka’s relations to the Brentanist movement. It draws on Brentanian ideas on the evidence of inner perception, on oblique consciousness, on active introspection, on correct and incorrect judgment, and on consciousness as a species of inner tribunal, in order to throw light on central features of Kafka’s writings, including stylistic features. Special attention is directed towards Die Verwandlung and Der Prozess, and a reading of the latter is offered according to which the trial of Joseph K. occurs entirely within the mind of K. himself. The revisions in the 1997 version of the paper relate especially to the treatment of Kafka and Brentano in Arnold Heidsieck’s book The Intellectual Contexts of Kafka’s Fiction: Philosophy, Law, Religion, of 1994. (shrink)

Brentanians defend the view that there are distinct types of object, but that this does not entail the admission of different modes of being. The most general distinction among objects is the one between realia, which are causally efficacious, and irrealia, which are causally inert. As for being, which is equated with existence, it is understood in terms of “correct acknowledgeability.” This view was defended for some time by Brentano himself and then by his student Anton Marty. Their position (...) is opposed to Bolzanian, Husserlian, and Meinongian ontologies, in which a distinction in the (higher) types of object implies a distinction in their mode of being. These Austro-German discussions anticipate much of the contemporary debate between Quineans, who accept only differences in objects, and neo-Meinongians or other ontological pluralists, who accept different modes of being. My paper first presents the Brentanian view in detail and then evaluates its philosophical significance. (shrink)

Franz Brentano’s works are not just full of deep and innovative insights into mind, world and values. His views also turned out to be highly influential upon several generations of students, who made them the basis of their own philosophical investigations, giving rise to what is known as the Brentano School (Albertazzi et al. 1996; Fisette & Fréchette 2007). In this chapter, I give a bird’s eye view of the Brentano School from a rather historical perspective. My leading hypothesis (...) is that one crucial factor explaining the rise of the school is Brentano’s unique strategy, within the academic context of the time, to promote the revival of philosophy as a rigorous science. After a brief introduction, I reconstruct the three main phases in the school’s development, namely Brentano’s teaching in Würzburg (1866-73), his teaching in Vienna (1874-95), and Anton Marty’s teaching in Prague (1880-1913). (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 95, Issue 2, pp 245 - 264 In the last few decades, the interest in Brentano’s philosophical psychology, especially in his theory of judgment, has been steadily growing. What, however, has remained relatively unexplored are the modifications that have been introduced over the years into this theory by Brentano himself and by his student Anton Marty. These amendments constitute the focus of the present paper. As will be argued, only by making such changes can the weaknesses (...) of the first formulation of the theory be overcome. Moreover, as the final section of the paper attempts to show, these modifications may even trigger further steps towards what we might label a new Brentanian theory of judgment. (shrink)

Phenomenology, according to Husserl, is meant to be philosophy as rigorous science. It was Franz Brentano who inspired him to pursue the ideal of scientific philosophy. Though Husserl began his philosophical career as an orthodox disciple of Brentano, he eventually began to have doubts about this orientation. The Logische Unterschungen is the result of such doubts. Especially after the publication of that work, he became increasingly convinced that, in the interests of scientific philosophy, he had to go in a (...) direction which diverged from Brentano and other members of this school (`Brentanists') who believed in the same ideal. An attempt is made here to ascertain Husserl's philosophical relation to Brentano and certain other Brentanists (Carl Stumpf, Benno Kerry, Kasimir Twardowski, Alexius Meinong, and Anton Marty). The crucial turning point in the development of these relations is to be found in the essay which Husserl wrote in 1894 (particularly in response to Twardowski) under the title `Intentional Objects' (which is translated as an appendix in this volume). This study will be of interest to historians of philosophy and phenomenology in particular, but also to anyone concerned with the ideal of scientific philosophy. (shrink)

Franz Brentano’s works are not just full of deep and innovative insights into mind, world and values. His views also turned out to be highly influential upon several generations of students, who made them the basis of their own philosophical investigations, giving rise to what is known as the Brentano School (Albertazzi et al. 1996; Fisette & Fréchette 2007). In this chapter, I give a bird’s eye view of the Brentano School from a rather historical perspective. My leading hypothesis (...) is that one crucial factor explaining the rise of the school is Brentano’s unique strategy, within the academic context of the time, to promote the revival of philosophy as a rigorous science. After a brief introduction, I reconstruct the three main phases in the school’s development, namely Brentano’s teaching in Würzburg (1866-73), his teaching in Vienna (1874-95), and Anton Marty’s teaching in Prague (1880-1913). (shrink)

Unification was originally introduced in automated deduction and term rewriting, but has recently also found applications in other fields. In this article, we give a survey of the results on unification obtained in two closely related, yet different, application areas of unification: description logics and modal logics.